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RECENT CASES.
ATTORNEys-DISBARMENT-NON-PROFSSIONAL MTSODNDUcT-An attorney
was tried and convicted of conspiring to conceal assets from a trustee in
bankruptcy. Held: It was good ground for disbarment although the offense
was not committed while exercising a function of his professional office.
In re Gottesfeld, 245 Pa. .314 (1914).
Conviction of a crime is generally held a good ground for the disbar-
ment of an attorney. Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1882). Some courts
hold that it is enough if offense is indictable. State v. Winton, ii Oregon
456 (1884). The crime need not be a felony, In re McCarthy, px N. W.
Rep. 963 (Mich. 1879); In re Madigan, 66 Minn. 9 (i896); but is enough
if it is a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. In re Kirby, 84 Fed. Rep.
6o6 0898); In re Wellcome, 23 Mont. 14o 0899).
As good character is an essential qualification for the admission of an
attorney to practice, he may be removed whenever he ceases to possess such
a character. And so it has been generally held that an attorney may be
disbarred for such misconduct unconnected with his professional duties as
shows him to be an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business
of others. In re Heyman, i4o N. Y. S. io65 (193); Delano's Case, 58
N. H. s (876); In re Wellcome, 58 Pac. Rep. 45 (Mont. 1899); Ex parte
Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1882). The lending of money usuriously was held not
to constitute a cause for disbarment, People v. Wheeler, 259 Ill. 99 (1913) ;
likewise, drawing cheque when he has no funds, not done in connection with
his profession. In re Stryker, i Wheeler Cr. Cas. 330 (N. Y. 1816). The
principal case is in accord with Ex parte Steinman,95 Pa. 220 (i88o), some-
times cited as contra to general rule above stated, but which really only
narrows it slightly in that State.
CARRIERS-Acr Or GoD--PRoxIMATE CAusE-A carrier received a con-
signment of fruit on the evening of February 1S. During that night a snow-
storm came up and the weather turned severely cold. On February z6, the car-
rier company operated passenger trains only. On February 17, a day more
severe than the former, the shipment was delivered in a damaged condition.
Held: The carrier is liable for damages, as it was the result of negligence on
the part of the carrier co-operating with the act of God. St. Louis & S. & F.
Ry. Co. v. Dreyfus, r41 Pac. Rep. 773 (Okl. 1914).
An act of God is an inevitable accident which cannot be prevented by
man: Sonneborn v. Southern Ry. Co., 65 S. C. 502 (1902). The act of God,
to exempt a carrier from liability, must be the proximate and not the remote
cause of loss: Michaels v. N. Y. Central Ry. Co., 3o N. Y. 564 (1864). Not
only this, but it must be the sole cause: M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Johnson. 34
OkI. 582 (19T2).
This case is in accord with the general rule, that if the negligence of a
carrier co-operates with the act of God, the carrier is liable: Grier v. St.
Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Ry. Co., io8 Mo. App. 565 (19o4); C. R.
L & P. Ry. Co. v. McKowe, 36 Okl. 41 (1912). Precautionary measures are
also required to be used by a carrier, when notified by the Government
Weather Bureau of unusual weather, to exempt it from liability: Wabash
R. Co. v. Sharpe, 107 N. W. Rep. 758 (Neb. i9o6).
CARRIERS-PA-SENGES-PAss--The plaintiff was injured while riding on
a pass. At the time of employment, transportation was promised as part
consideration for services, but when applied for, the applicant was required
to sign an agreement exempting carrier from liability. Held: The plaintiff
was a gratuitous passenger and the carrier exempt from liability. Hageman
v. Puget Sound Electric Ry., 141 Pac. Rep. 1o27 (Wash. 1914).
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"The obligation of a carrier as to the care required for the safety of
passengers is the same to a passenger riding on a free pass as to those who
pay fare, in the absence of a special agreement." In re Cal. Nay. & Imp.
Co., 1io Fed. Rep. 670 (Cal. i9o). The decisions are not in harmony as to
the effect given to a provision in a free pass exempting the carrier from
liability for injuries caused by its negligence, Harris v. Puget Sound, 52
Wash. 289 (i9o9) ; one view holding the exemption clause invalid as contrary
to public policy, G. C. & F. Ry. Co. v. McGown, 65 Texas 64o (1886);
Jacohus v. St. Paul Ry. Co., 2o Minn. 125 (1873); Mobile & 0. R. Co. v.
Hopkins, 41 Ala. 486 C869); the other view m accord with the principal
case holding the exemption clause valid, the pass being a mere gratuity,
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Adams, z92 U. S. 44o (z9o4); Boering v. Chesa-
peake Ry. Co., 193 U. S. 442 (1904).
If the pass is issued to the employees as a gratuity, the clause providing
the holder assumes all risks exempts carrier from liability. Dugan v. Blue
Hill Street Ry. Co., 193 Mass. 431 (1907). But where a pass constitutes a
portion of the consideration for service, liability of carrier exists. Peterson
v. Seattle Traction Co., 23 Wash. 615 (rgoo).
CI1aITABLE INSTITUTIONs-LTABILITY oi To Ts-A physician in a hos-
pital operated on one of the patients contrary to her wish. Held: The hospital,
being a charitable institution, is not liable for the torts of its servants
toward patients. Schloendorff v. N. Y. Hospital, ioS N. E. Rep. 92 (N. Y.
1914).
This case is in accord with the general rule that a charitable institution
is not liable for injuries to its inmates due to the negligence of its em-
ployees, where it has exercised due care in their selection. Corbett v. St.
Vincent's School, 177 N. Y. i6 (i9o3); Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 33
Atl. Rep. 595 (Conn. 1895). Different reasons have been given for exempt-
ing charities from liability. In a few jurisdictions where the immunity of
charities from liability for torts has been carried farthest and is practically
abisolute. the theory advanced is, that the corporation being the subject of a
charitable trust, to suffer a judgment to be recovered against it would be an
illegal diversion of trust estate. Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, iao Pa. 624
(1888). The decision has also been based on the theory that the beneficiary
of a charitable trust enters into a contract whereby he assumes the risk of
such torts. Bruce v. Church, 747 Mich. 230 (i9o); and, in the principal
case. it was based upon the theory that the relation between a hospital and
its physicians is not that of master and servant, but that the hospital, instead
of undertaking to act through the physicians, merely procures them to act
on their own responsibility. Consistently with the general rule it is held that
a charity is liable for the torts of its employees to strangers, they not being
recipients of its benefits. Hordern v. Salvation Army, 32 L R. A. 6a (N. Y.
xoro); injury to a mechanic employed by charity, Bruce v. Church, supra.
Only a few jurisdictions deny any degree of immunity to charities. Glavin
v. R. I. Hospital, 12 R. I. 411 (1878).
CONirIcr oF LAWS-CNTRACTS-WHAT LAw GovmNs-A retail liquor
dealer of Texas bought liquors and wines from a wholesale firm of Ohio,
and subsequently moved to Oklahoma. The purchase and sale of liquor were
legal in both Texas and Ohio, but contrary to statute in Oklahoma. Suit
was brought against the retail dealer in the courts of Oklahoma to recover
the contract price of the wines and liquors shipped to him by the wholesale
firm while he was in Texas. Held: This contract comes under the general
rule that contracts valid where made are valid everywhere. The contract in
question was made either in Ohio or Texas. and is valid in either State.
Recovery allowed. Klein v. Keller, 14T Pac. Rep. T117 (Okla. 1914).
The question of the legality of a contract is determined by the law of
the State or country in which the contract was made. Scudder v. Union
Nati. Dank, 9i U. S. 4o6 (1875) ; Midland Co. v. Broat, 50 Minn. 562 (x892).
When performance is to take place in a State other than that in which the
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contract was made, its validity is governed by the law of the State in which
it is to be performed. National Mutual Building Assn. v. Ashworth, 91 Va.
706 (1895). This rule, however, is departed from in some cases. Brown v.
American Finance Co., 31 Fed. Rep. S16 (U. S. 1887).
Even though the contract meets all requirements of the letx loc con-
tractus. another State or country may refuse to enforce it because contrary
to good morals. Levy v. Kentucky Distillb-g Co., 9 Ky. L Rep. 103 (1887);
injurious to the State or its citizens. Faulkner v. Hyman, 142 Mass. 53
(iM) ; in fraud or violation of the laws of the State. Fisher v. Lord, 63
N. H. 5T4 (1885); Swing v. Munson. 191 Pa. 582 (189o); contrary to public
policy. Rousillon v, Rousillon, 14 Ch. D. 351 (Eng. i88o). It was upon this
point that the principal case turned, whether or not the contract in question
was contrary to the laws and policies of the State of Oklahoma. Inasmuch
as both parties were engaged in business recognized as lawful in the States
where they were at the time the contract was entered into and performed,
and since there was involved no question of public morals or injury to the
State, the court applied the general rule and held the validity of the contract
to be governed by the lex loci contractus.
CoN.AcTS-CoNsIDERAn o-SuncrENcv-Shortly before a child's birth,
the defendants testator promised the father that if the child should be
named after him he would make some provision for it. After the child's
birth, the testator signed an instrument agreeing to place a sum in trust for
the child. Held: The privilege of naming a child is valid consideration for
a promise to pay money. Gardner v. Denison, 1o5 N. E. Rep. 359 "(Mass.
1914).
This case is in line with the other cases on the subject. Changing a
child's Christian name has been held sufficient consideration to support a
promise by the person at whose request the name was changed to leave the
child a certain sum, Babcock v. Chase, 92 Hun, 264 (N. Y. 1895); or to
convey land to the child. Daily v. Minnick, 91 N. W. Rep. 913 (Ia. x9o2).
The child cannot be said to have no interest in the name imposed. The con-
sequences affect him more than anyone else. He is deprived of the advantage
of having any other name and subjected to the possibility of detriment on
account of the name he bears. Eaton v. Libbey, 42 N. E. Rep. 1127 (Mass.
1896). Assuming that the privilege belongs to the parents, if they waive their
rights in favor of another, the child has an interest in.the name it shall bear
analogous to the interest it has in its own services which belong to the father,
but which, if the father waives his right, furnish good consideration for a
promissory note given to the child by one to whom the services have been
rendered. Eaton v. Libbey, supra; Nightingale v. Withington, i5 Mass. 27
(1818).
These cases illustrate the principle that anything done by the promisee,
entailing any loss or inconvenience even of the most trifling description, if
not utterly worthless in fact and in law, constitutes a sufficient consideration
for a promise, Clarke v. Sigourney, 17 Conn. 311 (i846), and that when a
party gets all he contracted for he cannot say that he gets no consideration
or that it has failed, AVolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294 (882). The parties
themselves are the just measurers of the value of that which they give.
Pollock, Principles of Contract, p. 184, par. 2 (Ed. 1911); Sturlyn v. Albany,
i Cro. Eliz. 67 (1587); Bainbridge v. Firinstone, 8 A. & E. 743 (Eng. 1838);
Brooks v. Haigh, io A. & E. 309, 323. 334 (Eng. 1839); Wilkinson v. Oli-
veira, x Bing. N. C. 490 (1835). And as one is free to make or refuse a
contract, he is bound by it when made. Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 380 (Mass.
1827) ; Hempler v. Schneider, 17 Mo. 258 (1852); Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N. Y.
91 (1878); Lindell v. Rokes, 6o Mo. 249 (1875).
CoNmA. cTs-Co.sPra.cy-Boycorr-A labor union sought to enjoin an
agreement between a rival union and an employer which provided that all
nersons employed should be members of the defendant union whenever such
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men were available. Held: The incitements to the contract being those of
business advantage alone, and there being no intent to injure the plaintiff, the
bill must be dismissed. Hoban v. Dempsey, xo4 N. E. Rep. 711 (Mass.
9141n- general, it is a tort to place pressure more than argument on an
individual in order to dissuade him from dealing with a third person. Casey
v. Cincinnati Typo. Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135 (x89i); Brennan v. United
Hatters of N. A, 73 N. J. L. 729 (i9o7) ; Prickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572
(igo6). There is a clear distinction between acts which have their induce-
ment in malice or ill-will, and those which have their inducement in business
competition and rivalry. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. a
598 (Eng. 1899); Continental Ins. Co. v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 67
Fed. Rep. 310 (1895); Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 2o7 ( 9o5). It is on this
ground that the court distinguishes the principal case from De Minico v.
Craig, 207 Mass. 593 (i910), and Hanson v. Innis, 211 Mass. 3oi (1912).
where the result of the contract between the plaintiff's employer and the
defendant was that the plaintiff was discharged. There was nothing of the
boycott about this contract, for the essence of the boycott is intentional
injury. State v. Stockford, ioe Am. St. Rep. 28 (Conn. x9o4); Doremus v.
Henning, i76 I11. 6o8 (1899); Eitz v. Minn. Produce Ex., 79 Minn. 140
(19oo). Nor was there economic pressure, threats of business loss or inter-
ference with absolute freedom of action. A voluntary and unenforced agree-
ment, made solely for the material advantage of the contracting parties, is
valid. National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders Ass'n, x69 Fed. Rep.
259 (gog); Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255 (igoS); Kissan v. U. S. Printing
Co., igg N. Y. 76 (19o).
CoTRAcrs---MErNG OF THE MINDs-An undisclosed agent made a con-
tract with defendant for certain paving blocks. The blocks were unmer-
charitable and plaintiff, as an undisclosed principal, sued for damages. Held:
This was a valid contract, as the very parties intended to be bound were
bound, the necessary parties were present and there was a meeting of the
minds. Kelly Asphalt Block Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., io5 N. E.
Rep. 88 (N. Y. 1914).
It is well settled that to form a valid contract there must be a meeting
of two minds, Ross v. Savage, 63 So. Rep. 148 (Fla. 1913), at the same time
and on the same terms. Sutter v. Raeder, So S. W. Rep. 813 (Mo. x899);
Creecy v. Grief, 6L, S. E. Rep. 769 (Va. i9o8); Seurs & Co. v. Arms Co.,
178 Ill App. 318 (1913). A contract must result from the concurrence of
the minds of both parties, it is not dependent on the understanding of one
of them. Mfg. Co. v. Assurance Co., 76 S. E. Rep. 865 (N. C. 1913). No
action will lie for an order of goods obtained by the false and fraudulent
representations of the plaintiff that he was the authorized agent of a certain
manufacturer, Fox v. Gabel, 66 Conn. 397 (89s), nor if the plaintiff falsely
represented himself as the agent of an undisclosed principal, Rodliff v.
Dullinger, 141 Mass. 1 (1886). Every one has a right to select and determine
with whom he will contract and cannot have another person thrust upon
him without his consent. Smelting Co. v. Mining Co., 127 U. S. 387 (1887).
Though a contract resting in parol must be assented to by both parties in
the same sense, Martin v. Thrower, 3 Ga. App. 784 (19o8), yet it is not
necessary that the minds of both meet on express words clearly expressed.
Zitske v. Grohn, 128 Wis. i59 (i906). If parties have failed to reach an
agreement as to all the conditions, there is no contract, though both parties
supposed there was. Sheldon v. Crane, 125 N. W. Rep. 238 (Iowa, 1909).
A party to a written contract is bound thereby, in absence of fraud, et cetera.
And he may not assert he did not intend to agree to the contract. Weil v.
Mfg. Co., 8o Atl. Rep. 447 (R- I. Igi).
The burden is on him who sues for breach of contract to prove the
meeting of the minds. Swing v. Walker, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 366 (i9o5). This
can be done by the contract itself where the language is plain and unambigu-
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ots. Ellicott Co. Y. U. S., 44 Ct. Cl. z27 (U. S. Ct. Cl. 19o9). It is for the
jury to say whether a contract existed where all negotiations were oral and
evidence is conflicting, Woolman Y. Ice Co., 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 596 (z9o2),
or if negotiations consist of letters and conversations, Transmission Co. v.
Crane Co., 7o N. E. Rep. 319 (Ill. z9o4); Rogers v. Fenimore, 4 AtL Rep.
886 (Del. Super. 1898) ; but it is for the court where transaction consists of
letters and telegrams. Service Co. v. Drug Co., 128 S. IV. Rep. 7 (Mo.
App. x91o).
CONTRACTS-MORAL OBuGATION-One under contract to dig ditches and
lay pipe for Philadelphia's filtration system was required to do work clearly
outside of his contract. This was done by direction of the engineer of the
department with the expectation on the part of both him and the contractor
that it would be paid for as additional work. The councils directed such
payment and the Mayor approved the ordinance. Held: There was a moral
obligation on the part of the city to pay the plaintiff's claim and this became
a legal obligation when its payment was assumed and directed in the manner
provided by law. The plaintiff is entitled to the amount of the claim and
also compensation for its unjustifiable detention. Cunningham v. Phila., z4S
Pa. x8S (z914).
A contractor who had engaged to construct a sewer for the city for a
fixed price preferred to do the work in a way different and more expensive
than that provided in his contract. The city would pay only the fixed con-
tract price. The contractor sued for the cost of his extra work, and was
non-suited. Councils later passed an ordinance making an appropriation for
payment of the contractor's claim, a referee having found that this amount
was morally due. A taxpayer's bill was filed to restrain payment, on the
ground that the city was under no moral obligation to make it, and that the
ordinance was invalid. .The lower-court-granted the relief prayed for, and
this decree was affirmed. Longstreth v. Phila., 245 Pa. 233 (1914).
The general rule prevailing in the large majority of jurisdictions is that
mere moral obligation does not constitute consideration. Thompson v.
Thompson, 78 N. Y. Supp. 389 (19o2); Davis v. Anderson, 99 Va. 62o
(ioi). To support a subsequent promise there must have been some pre-
existing legal obligation which at one time constituted a good and valuable
consideration. Hendricks v. Robinson, 56 Miss. 694 (1879); Sternbergh v.
Provoost, 13 Barb. 365 (N. Y. 8sx). A few States, however, still cling to
the early English rule laid down b, Lord Mansfield n the case of Atkins v.
Hill, I Cowp. 284 (Eng. 1775), which upheld moral obligation alone as good
consideration for a subsequent express promise. Among these States arePennsylvania and Maryland. Bentley v. Lamb, fa2 Pa. 48o (s886); Robinson
v. Hurst, 78 Md. s9 (5893).
That the courts of Pennsylvania will enforce a promise made in view of
a moral obligation is clearly shown in the two principal cases supra. The
difference between the results reached is due not to any doubt as to this
proposition but to the difference in facts. In the first case, Cunningham v.
Phila., the facts were held sufficient to set up a moral obligation on the part
of the city to pay, while in the latter, Longstreth v. Phila., the court found
that the city was at no time under any obligation, even moral.
CO xnAc1rs-THm PART-?S RiGHTs-A subcontractor sued the principal
contractor, declaring upon the contractor's bond, conditioned for the per-
formance of the building contract and for the payment of all claims for
labor and material furnished. Held: The subcontractor cannot recover, since
there was no existing liability on the part of the owner, the obligee in the
bond, to him at the time of the execution of the bond. Cleveland Metal, etc.,
Co. v. Gaspard, xo6 N. F. Rep. 9 (Ohio, 1914).
The cases upon this question are decidedly in conflict. The principal
case is in accord with the New York doctrine that a third party can sue on
a contract made for his benefit only when the promisee was under some
existing obligation toward him at the time the contract was made, Lawrence
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v. Fox, 2o N. Y. 268 (1839); Jefferson v. Asch, 25 L R. A. 257 (Minn.
i894); La Crosse Lumber Co. v. Schwartz, 147 S. W. Rep. 5ox (Mo. 1912).
However, some of the jurisdictions which follow this rule hold that a moral
obligation is sufficient. Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N. Y. iog (i899); Sample
v. Hale, 34 Neb. 220 (1892). In a few jurisdictions, the third person can
sue only when there was no such pre-existing obligation. National Bank v.
Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123 (1878). The prevailing American rule, subject
to various -limitations in the several jurisdictions, is that the third party can
always sue, regardless of whether or not there was a pre-existing obligation.
Ochs v. Carnahan Co., 8o N. E. Rep. 163 (Ind. 1907); Zwietusch v. Becker,
14o N. W. Rep. xo56 (Wis. 1913); Olson v. Ostby, 178 II. App. i65 (1913).
For cases and a thorough discussion of the entire subject, see Note to Jeffer-
son v. Asch, supra, and 1S H. . R. 804.
In Pennsylvania, there must be some transfer of property from promisee
to promisor to allow the third person to sue. Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76
(1888); Hostetter v. Hollinger, 117 Pa. 6o6 (1888). In a few jurisdictions,
the third party cannot sue in any case. Tweedle v. Atkinson, I B. & S.
393 (Eng. 1861); Mellen v. Whipple, I Gray, 317 (Mass. 1854); Maccabees
v. Sharp, 128 N. 'W. Rep. 786 (Mich. 19io). Massachusetts and Michigan
recognize a few exceptions. A mere incidental beneficiary can never sue on
a contract to which he is not a party. Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y. 219
(1892); Uhrich v. Globe Surety Co., 166 S. W. Rep. 845 (Mo. 1914). In the
majority of jurisdictions, beneficiaries cannot sue upon contracts under seal.
Willard v. Wood, 135 U. S. 309 (i8go)'; De Bolle v. Penna. Ins. Co., 4
Whart. 68 (Pa. 1838); Emmitt v. Brophy, 42 Ohio St. 83 (1884) eontra.
Either by statute or decision, the beneficiary of an insurance policy can sue
upon it in every jurisdiction. Blinn v. Dame, 207 Mass. 159 (9ii) ; Motley
v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 29 Me. 337 (1849). Likewise, except in England,
a mortgagee can sue the grantee of land who has assumed the mortgage.
15 H. L R. 8o8.
COarOaArOS-SuxLAat~Y OF NAME-s-Mandamus proceedings were
brought to compel the Secretary of State to issue a license to the "Kenne-
wick Fruit Exchange." By statute no corporation could organize under a
name so similar to that of another corporation as to be misleading. There
were already corporations operating in the State under the following names:
"Kennewick Fruit-Land Company," "Kennewick District Fruit Growers'
Association," and "Kennewick Fruit and Produce Company." Hetd: That
the name of the proposed company was so similar to those existing corpora-
tions as to be misleading. State ex rel. Collins v. Howell, See. of State, 141
Pac. 1157 (Wash. 1914).
Both at common law and under the majority of the State incorporation
acts, a corporation has a right to the exclusive use of its corporate name and
this right will be protected even to the extent of preventing the use by
another corporation of a name, not identical, but substantially the same, and
therefore calculated to deceive. Phila. Trust, Safe Deposit and Ins. Co. v.
Phila. Trust Co., 123 Fed. Rep. 534 (1903); People's Outfitting Co. v.
People's Outlet'Co., i;o Mich. 398 (1912); Corning Glass Works v. Coming
Cut Glass Co., 9r, N. Y. 173 (i9io); Electromobile Co., Ltd., v. British
Electromobile Company, Ltd., 97 L. T. Rep. z96 (Eng. i9o7).
The names of the following corporations have been held to be so similar
as to be misleading: "Kansas City Real Estate Exchange" and "Kansas City
Real Estate and Stock Exchange," 92 Mo. 355 (1887); "National Liberty
League" and "National Liberty Legion," 225 Ill. 496 (1907); "Glucose Sugar
Refining Co." and "American Glucose Sugar Refining Company," 56 At. Rep.
861 (N. J. t899). The following have been held sufficiently dissimilar: "The
Hvgeia Water Ice Co." and "The New York Hygeia Ice CO.," 14o N. Y. 94
(O94) ; "The Michigan Savings Bank" and "The Bank of Michigan," x62
Mich. 297 (19io); "The Elgin Butter Co." and "The Elgin Creamery Co.,"
155 Ill. 127 (1895).
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The Washington statute corresponds generally with the provisions of
the incorporation laws of other States-N. J. Laws 1896, p. 28o, c. i8s; 21
Del. Laws 445, c. 273 (1899)-and with the English Companies Act, 8 Edw.
7, c. 69 (198).
In Pennsylvania there is no such prohibitive statute. But the Secretary
of State will refuse a charter to a company with a name similar to that of
another corporation. It tends toward complications in the matter of levying'
taxes and in judicial matters. Kidd Bros. and Burgher Steel Wire Co., 17
Pa. C. C. 238 (1896).
CRIMINAL LAV-ACCOMPLIE-WHAT CONSTITUTES-The accused hired an
agent and completed arrangements with him to burn a house while the wit-
ness was listening. The accused and the witness were not present when the
house was burned. Held: The witness was not an accomplice within the
ruile requiring an accomplice's testimony to be corroborated. State v. Grant,
14o Pac. Rep. 959 (Idaho, 1914).
The term "accomplice" includes all those who participate in the com-
mission of a crime, whether as principal in the first or second degree, or
accessory before or after the fact, In re Rowe, 77 Fed. Rep. 161 (1896);
People v. Coffey, 119 Pac. Rep. 9oi (Cal. 1911); although a few decisions
have held that an accessory after the fact is not an accomplice, State v.
Umble, 115 Mo. 452 (1893). The general rule, as laid down in the principal
case, is well established that an accomplice must actually co-operate in the
commission of the crime. Mere knowledge that a crime is to be committed
and concealment of such knowledge is not sufficient. Levering v. Common-
wealth, 132 Ky. 666 (i9O9) ; State v. Roberts, 15 Ore. 187 (887) ; Smith v.
State, 23 Tex. App. 357 (1887). A person who participates in the moral
guilt of a crime but is not connected therewith in such a way that he could
be indicted for the offense, is not an accomplice. State v. Gordon, 117 N. W.
Rep. 483 (Minn. I9o8). An accomplice must have criminal intent, Walker v.
The State, iz8 Ga. 757 (1903) ; and must co-operate voluntarily. People v.
Miller, 66 Cal. 468 (1885).
The great weight of authority is that one who joins in the commission
of a crime for the purpose of exposing it, and bringing the criminals to
punishment and honestly carries out that design, is not an accomplice. Com-
monwealth v. Hollister, 157 Pa. 13 (1893) ; State v. Smith, III Pac. Rep. 19
(Nev. 1911); contra, Dever v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. App. 396 (x896).
CRIMINAL LAW-FORMER JEOPARDY-SAME OFFENsE-The defendant,
having been in jeopardy upon an information or affidavit that he contrib-
uted to the moral delinquency of a female person, was indicted for rape.
Held: The defense of former jeopardy must fail. The words "same offense"
mean the same offense-not the same transaction, not the same acts, not the
same circumstances or the same situation. State v. Rose, io6 N. E_ Rep. 5o
(Ohio, 1914).
The general rule at commori law seems to be that in order to make the
plea of former jeopardy a good defense the two offenses must be in sub-
stance precisely the same, or at least of the same nature or species. People
v. Bentley, 77 Cal. 7 (1888) ; Com. v. Fredericks, iS5 Mass. 455 (1892). Or
the one offense must be an ingredient of the other. State v. Cooper, 13
N. J. L 361 (1833). The test seems to be that if the evidence offered to
support the second indictment would have been admissible at the former
trial, would have related to the same crime, and would have warranted a
conviction for that crime, the offenses are identical, and the plea of former
jeopirdy is good. Wilson et al. v. State, 24 Conn. 57 (185s); Smith v. State,
8 Ind. 553 (188); U. S. v. Nickerson, 17 How. 2oN; Com. v. Hiland, i Pa.
C. C. sp (i886).
By statute, an act may constitute more than one offense. In some juris-
dictions under such circumstances an acquittal or conviction of one offense
will be a bar to an indictment for the other. Dinkey v. Co., 17 Pa. 126 (185);
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Wilcox v. State, 6 Lea 57! (Tenn. 188o). Especially where one offense is
an ingredient of the other. State v. Cooper, supra. But see contra, Morey
v. Com., io8 Mass. 433 (1871); Berkowitz v. U. S., 93 Fed. 452 (1899).
One who is convicted of a crime less in degree than the offense for
which he is indicted is by implication acquitted of the greater offense and
may plead said acquittal as a bar to a subsequent indictment for it. State v.
Smith, z Vt. 324 (1871) ; Com. v. Neeley, 2 Chester Co. Rep. x91 (Pa. 1884);
Williams v. Com., 1o2 Ky. 381 (1897). The converse is also held. State v.
Hattabough, 66 Ind. 223 (1879); Triplett v. Com, 84 Ky. i93 (z886).
CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-OWN ERSHIP Or PoPERT'-The prosecutor
contracted with an owner of cattle that he would collect all the cattle he
found on her range and would pay her a certain price per head. One steer
not discovered nor paid for by him was stolen by the defendant, who was in-
dicted for larceny of the prosecutor's property. Held: The contract did not
vest the property in the prosecutor and larceny of his property cannot be
sustained. State v. Childers, i42 Pac. Rep. 333 (Ore. 1914).
The above case is in accord with the undisputed law that an indictment
for larceny alleging the property stolen to be in one person cannot be sus-
tained if the property is found to be in another. Young v. State, 73 Ark.
169 (19o4); Pitts v. State, 22 S. IV. Rep. 410 (Tex. x893); State v. Dredden,
4! AtL Rep. 925 (DeL t898).
This decision also substantiates the well-sdttled doctrine that a contract
involving the sale of non-specific goods does not vest property in the vendee
until the said goods are actually specified. State v. Cotterel, 12 Idaho 572
(1906); Martin Bros. & Co. v. Lesan, 129 Ia. 573 (igo6); Conrad v. Penn.
R. Co., 214 Pa. 98 (19o6); Kellogg v. Frohlich, 139 Mich. 612 (i9o5). How-
ever, title to personal property will pass from seller to buyer when the
parties agree that it shall, whatever the circumstances. Levassen v. Ca'y,
3 Att. 46T (Me. 1886); WVagar v. Detroit Land N. R. Co., 79 Mich. 648 (189o).
Even in the case of specific goods, in the absence of a contrary intention, no
title passes to the buyer on a contract of sale if the vendor is required to do
anything to such property before delivering it. Blackwood v. Cutting Pack-
ing Co., 76 Cal. 212 (1888); Wollensock v. Briggs, ii9 Ill. 453 0887);
Foster v. Ropes, III Mass. io (1872). But as to whether the weighing or
measuring of specific goods by the seller prevents property from vesting in
the vendee, there is a decided conflict of authority in America. Many States
hold that if the weighing or measuring is merely for the purpose of ascer-
taining the e vendee. Farmers' Phosphate Co. v. Gill,
69 Md. 537 (1888) ; Sanger v. Waterbury, 116 N. Y. 37' (1889); Nash Y.
Brewster, 39 Minn. 530 (i888) ; Bash v. Walsh, 39 Mo. 192 (1866). Contra:
Dixon v. Meyer, 7 Gratt. 240 (Va. 185x); Hutchinson v. Grand Trunk R. R.
Co., sg N. H. 487 (1879); Burrows v. Whitaker, 71 N. Y. 291 (1877); Haug
v. Gillett, 14 Kans. 140 (1875). Though the decisions are not unanimous,
England still clings to the earlier view that property does not vest. Sim-
mons v. Swift, s Barne &c. 857 (Eng. 1826); Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East 614
(Eng. i8o5) ; Swanwick v. Sothern, 9 Ad. and El. 895 (Eng. 1839).
CsImixA. LAw-SuBj.cT or LARcENY-OYsmTs-Oysters taken from
their natural beds in a State oyster reserve, contrary to the provisions of a
statute, are not the subject of larceny, and the statutory penalty for such
taking is the only one that can be inflicted. State v. Johnson, 141 Pac. 1040
(Wash. 1914).
This decision is in accord with the well-settled principle that oysters
owing naturally in the public waters of a State belong to the people of that
tate, who may take them in pursuance of their common right to fish, unless
there are prohibitive statutes. Smith v. Maryland, 59 U. S. 71 (1855)_; Brown
v. De Groff, So N. J. L. 409 (1888) ; Allen v. Allen, xg R. 1. 114 (1898). The
State undoubtedly has the power to pass such statutes, regulating the right
to take shell-fish and other fish. Corfield v. CoryCll, 4 Wash. Circ. Ct. 371
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(1823); Ex parte Fritz, 86 Miss. 210 (1o95); State v. Connor, io7 N. C.
931 (i8go); State v. Cozzens, 2 R. I. 561 (i85o). The violation of such
statutes, however, as is intimated in the principal case, is not common-law
larceny; the statutory penalty alone can be imposed. Rowe v. State, 92 Ark.
155 (igog); People v. Hislop, 77 N. Y. 3I (1879); McElhiney v. Common-
wealth, 22 Pa. 365 (1853).
The rule as to oysters growing naturally in public waters does not apply
to oysters planted by an individual in a clearly marked bed in which they
do not naturally exist. Such oysters are the subject of larceny. State v.
Taylor, 27 N. J. L. 117 (i858) ; People v. Wanger, 43 Misc. 136 (N. Y. 1904) ;
People v. Morrison, 124 App. Div. xo (N. Y. r9o8). Oysters, although usually
classed as animals ferae naturae, which at common law were not the subject
of larceny unless reclaimed from their wild state or reduced to actual pos-
session, Regina v. Townley, 12 Cox C. C. 59 (Eng. 1871), differ from most
wild animals in that they do not need to be tamed or confined, since they do
not stray away; therefore the comm -ilaw principle has no application.
State v. Taylor, supra.
EvIDENcE-DYLG DE LARATIoxs-The decedent was violently assaulted
by her husband, and believing that she was about to die, made certain state-
ments concerning the assault. She did not die until four or five days after
the declarations were made. Held: The statements were admissible as dying
declarations against the husband. State v. Lewis, 141 Pac. Rep. io25 (Wash.
1914).
The authorities are ample in support of the proposition that dying
declarations do not lose their character as such by the fact that the party
making them did not die till after the lapse of considerable time. State v.
Oliver, 2 Houst. 585 (Del. 1863); Boulden v. State, io2 Ala. 78 (1893). "The
standard required for the admissibility of the dying declaration," says the
court in the principal case, "is that the declarant should have believed that
she was about to die, that she made the declaration under the belief that she
would not recover, and that she did die of the illness from which she was
suffering as the direct and proximate result of the original injury." Accord:
Wilson v. Boeiem, x5 Johns. 286 (N. Y. i818) ; Sullivan v. Com., 93 Pa. 284
(1884); Corn. v. Brewer, 164 Mass. 577 0895).
The reason for the admissibility of dying declarations was thus expressed
at the Old Bailey: "The mind, impressed with the awful idea of approach-
ing dissolution, acts under a sanction equally powerful with that which it is
presumed to feel by a solemn appeal to God upon an oath." King v. Drum-
mond, Leach's Cases in Crown law (4th Ed.), page 337 (Eng. 1784). In
recent years there have been two equally pronounced, but diametrically
opposed, tendencies respecting the value of dying declarations. One view
favors the extension of their admissibility to include civil cases, as well as
criminal cases involving homicide. Thurston v. Fritz, 138 Pac. Rep. 62S
(Kans. 1914); Wigniore's Evidence, Vol. II, §r436 (Ed. x9o4). The other
view is that dying declarations should be excluded in all cases. People v.
Falletto, 96 N. E. Rep. 355 (N. Y. 1911); Chamberlayne's Modern Law of
Evidence, Vol. IV, §2860 (Ed. 1913). In People v. Falletto, supra, the court
said: "Dying declarations are dangerous because made with no fear of
prosecution for perjury, and without the test of cross-examination, which is
the best method known to bring out the full and exact truth."
JURORS-MISCONDUcT-UNATHORIZED VIEw-During a murder trial, two
of the jurors visited the scene of the homicide, but did not communicate the
fact to their fellow-jurors. Held: Such conduct is not of itself sufficient to
warrant the granting of a new trial, but prejudice must be shown to have
resulted. People v. Yee King, 141 Pac. Rep. 1047 (Cal. 1914).
This case is in accord with the general rule that any misconduct on the
part of the jury which is prejudicial to the appellant will entitle him to a new
trial. People v. Mitchell, 34 Pac. Rep. 698 (Cal. 1893); jurors treated by
persons interested, McGill v. Air Line Ry., 59 L R. A. 736 (S. C. x9o6).
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But bare misconduct, if the appellant is not prejudiced thereby, wiln not
vitiate the verdict. Emporia v. Yuengling. 96 Pac. Rep. 850 (Kans. z9o8);
measuring distances in a criminal case, Hardin v. State, 49 S. W. Rep. 607
(Tex. 1899) ; reading biased newspaper when guilt of accused is clear, State
v. Williams, 105 N. W. Rep. 265 (Minn. i9o5); personally viewing a dog
alleged to be vicious, Vooldridge v. White, 48 S. \W. Rep. io8i (Ky. 1899);
examining vehicle used in a collision, Thoreson v. Quinn, 147 N. W. Rep.
716 (Minn. 1914) ; visiting scene of accident, Grunderson v. Minneapolis Ry.,
148 N. W. Rep. 6i (Minn. 1914); viewing scene of alleged burglary, People
v. Hope, 62 Cal. 29 (1882); noting speed of train which caused injury, Siem-
sen v. Oakland, 134 Cal. 494 (1901). Where the locus itself is in dispute,
or where its exact condition has an essential bearing upon the controversy,
an unauthorized view of the locus in quo by a juror is ground for setting
aside the verdict, Siemsen v. Oakland, supra; but where there is no contro-
versy as to the place inspected and no prejudice resulting from inspection, the
verdict should not be disturbed, Bowman v. Furniture Co., 96 Ia. 188 (x895).
In many jurisdictions the ruling is more stringent in criminal cases and
especially in the case of felonies, where it is held that if the appellant has
or might'have been prejudiced, the verdict will be vitiated. Capps v. State of
Arkansas, 159 S. W. Rep. 193 (Ark. 1913).
J. -Y-Ri, IT TO TRIAL BY JURY-JUDGMENT N. 0. V.-A Pennsylvania
statute (P. L 9o5, p. 286, c. 198) provides that if a request by one party
for binding instructions has been reserved or declined by the trial judge, and
the jury has found for the other party, judgment non obsiante ,eredicto
may be entered by the court, if, upon examination of the whole record, it
believes that the request should have been granted. In an action for negli-
gence such judgment was entered and it was contended by the appellant that
she had been deprived of her constitutional right of trial by jury. Held:
The statute was not a contravention of the right of trial by jury. and was
therefore constitutional. Stryker v. Montoursville Borough, 57Pa. Super.
Ct. ao (1914).
The constitutionality of this act was learnedly discussed in the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Slocum v. New York Life Insurance
Co., 228 U. S. 364 (1913). There it was held by a divided court of five to
four that it was in violation of the Seventh Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution for the Circuit Court of Appeals to enter judgment n; o. v. against
one party after the jury had found in his favor. But the Slocum Case
guarantees the right of trial by jury in the Federal courts only. It in no
way applies to proceedings in the State courts. Thus a Massachusetts statute
(gog, c. 236), corresponding closely to the Pennsylvania Act, has been held
not to deprive one of the constitutional right of trial by jury. Bothwell v.
Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 215 Mass. 467, 62 U. oF P. L R. 149 (1913). For
a discussion of this subject, see 61 U. oF P. L R. 673, 26 HARv. L. REV. 732.
NEGLIE CE -DAMAGOES-FRIGHT-The defendant's gas tank exploded
and ripped up the floor on which the plaintiff was working. The plaintiff
through fright fainted to the floor, although she was neither struck nor
thrown by concussion. Held: The jury was justified in finding that the
explosion caused the injuries. One who from fright, faints and falls, may
recover for the physical injuries sustained thereby, though there can be no
recovery for fright alone. Conley v. United Drug Co., xoS N. E. Rep. 975
(Mas,. 1914).
The dicta in the principal case is in accord with the distinction drawn by
Massachusetts in cases involving physical injuries resulting from fright. All
jurisdictions agree that mere fright alone is not sufficient ground for dam-
ages. Ewing v. Pitts., Cinn., Chicago and St. Louis Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 14
L. R. A. 666 (1892) ; Huston v. Freemansburg Borough. 212 Pa. 548 (19o5),
Southern Pacific Co. v. Ammons, 26 S. \V. Rep. 134 (Tex. 1894); Spade v.
Lynn and Boston Ry., 168 Mass. 285 (18g9); Kalen v. Terre Haute and
RECENT CASES
Indianapolis Ry., 47 N. E. Rep. 694 (Ind. 1897). But where the fright is
accompanied by immediate physical injuries directly caused by the defend-
ant's negligence, though the battery be almost negligible, it is equally well
established that damages will lie for both. Warren v. Boston and Maine
Ry., 40 N. E. Rep. 895 (Mass. x895); Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. io2
(19io) ; Hess v. Amer. Pipe Co., 22' Pa. 67 (igo8); Lowev. Metropolitan
St. Ry. Co., "30 S. W. Rep. 19 (Mo. enio).
Where the defendant's act causes fright, which in turn results in physical
injuries, there is a conflict of opinion. The rule in New York, Pennsylvania,
and in the majority of the eastern States s that1 as fright cannot form thebasis of an action, no recovery may be had for injuries resulting therefrom.This rule is based on grounds of pblic policy. Nelson v. Crawford, 122
Mich. 466 (1899); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., iSr N. Y. xo7 (i8g6);
Reed v. Ford, I12 S. WV. Rep. 6oo (Ky. xgo8) ; Hack v. Dady, rx8 N. Y.Sup. o6 (9o9); Morris v. Lackawanna and Wyoming Valley Ry., 28 Pa.
98 isio). The English rule, which prevails in the majority of the western
and southern States, regards fright a link in the chain of causation and
allows 'an action for resulting physical injuries. Dulieu v. White & Sons,
L. R. 2 K. B. 669 (Eng. i9ox); Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Min.
x34 (x&92) ; Yoakum v. Kroeger, 27 5. W. Rep. 953 (Tlex. 1894); Simone V.
Rhode Island Co., 2.8 R. I. ,86 (xgo7); Pankopf v. Hinkley, i4x Wis. 146
(go9); Green v. Shoemaker, 73 AtI. Rep. 688 (Mid. 1909); Spearman v.McCrary, *8 So. Rep. 927 (Ala. 1912). Massachusetts draws a distinction
between cases where the connection of the physical injuries with the frightis wholly internal, in which case no recovery is allowed. Spade v. Lynn and
Boston Ry., x68 Mass. 285 ('897); White v. Sander, 168 Mass. 296(19)Smith v. Postal Tel. Co., 5 N. E. Rep. 380 (Mass. x8p9) and where the
fright induces reaction which results in external injury, n which case dam-
ages will lie. Cameron v. New Eng. Tel. Co., 182 Mass..3Io (1902); Nealand
v. Lynn and Boston Ry., R73 Mass. 43 (8 N).
NEoLIgNCE--REs IPSA LoQurrcR-As an ice dealer was carrying a p iee
of ice into a customer's kitchen, the ice fel from his tongs and injured the
customer. Held: Negligence may be inferred from the happening of the
accident. O'Neil v. Toomey, 75 . E. Rep. 974 (Mass. 1914).
Before the well established doctrine of Res ipsa Loquiur may be
applied, it is necessary to show that the primary physical cause of the acci-
dent is within the control of the defendant. The mere fact of an accident is
insufficient to impose a liahilityr for negligence. Renders v. Grand Trunk Ry.
Co, o5 N E. Rep. 368 (Mich. a906); Kohner v. Capital Traction Co.,
Apph in ('D. C. 9o3). Negligence can lxe inferred only in the case of an
nexplained accident wvhich, in the ordinary experience of mankind, would
not have happcned without fault on the part of the defendant. l3reen v.New York Central & Hudson R. R. Co., 189 N. Y. 297 (888); Richmond
Railway & Electric Co. v. Hudgins, 10o Va..409 .(19o.);. MeNamara v.Boston & Maine R. Co.3 202 Mass. 49 (io9). The rue is based largey
on the fact that because the management of the thing which caused theinjury is in the defendant, it is within his power to produce evidence of the
actual cause of the accident, while the plaintiff can only indicate the truth
by circumstances which cast a suspicion of misconduct upon the defendant
criffen v. Manice, 66 N. Y. E Rep0i). The inference of negligence is
drawn from the nature of the act and the probabilities of accident and not
from the relation of the parties. Consequently, the weight of authority is
that the relation between the parties need not be contractual. Judson v. Giant
Power Co., o 7 Cal. 539 (M895); Cicinvnati Traction Co. v. Holzenkamp,
74 Ohio St. 379 (9o6). Pennsylvania, however, applies the doctrine only
to cases where there is some contractual relation between the parties, Kepner
Ne Harrisburg Traction Co., 183 Pa. 24 ((897); and then only when there is
an absolute duty or an obligation practically amounting to that of an insurer.
East End Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Torpedo Co., 2 s  Pa. 35 ( i89g).
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Nw"t;cE-U.;EGisTFRED Av:ro.ioaILn ON A HIGHWAY-An automobile,
operated in violation of a statute forbidding the use of unregistered motor
vehicles, was damaged in a collision with an electric car on a public highway.
Held: Occupants of unregistered automobiles are trespassers on the highway.
and have no rights against other travelers except to be protected from reck-
less or wanton injury. Dean v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., ioS N. E. Rep.
616 (Mass. 1914).
This decision reaffirms the established Massachusetts rule. Dodley v.
Northampton St. Ry. Co., 89 N. E. Rep. 25 (Mass. igog); Chase v. New
York Cent. R. Co., 94 N. E. Rep. 377 (Mass. siir); Holden v. McGillicuddy,
102 N. E. Rep. 923 (Mass. 1913). In Dudley v. Northampton St. Ry. Co.,
supra, the court said, inter alia, "The legislature intended to outlaw unregis-
tered automobiles, the owners of which furnished no means by which they
could be identified and compelled to make proper compensation for the
injuries which they might cause to other travelers." Passengers, though
unaware that the car is not registered, are barred from recovery. Feeley v.
City of Melrose, 205 Mass. 329 (1910). But an automobile operator, not
licensed personally, as required by statute, may recover. Bourne v. Whit-
man, 2o9 Mass. 155 (1911). The distinction between non-licensed operators
and unregistered automobiles has been recognized in two recent Pennsylvania
cases. Bortner v. York Ry. Co., 22 Pa. Dist. Rep. 84 (1913), discussed in
61 U. o, P. L R. 346; and Yeager v. Winton Motor Carriage Co., 53 Pa.
Super. Ct. 202 (1913). The legislature of Connecticut has provided by
statute that no recovery shall be had by the. owner, operator, or passenger
of an unregistered motor vehicle, "for any injury to person or property
received by reason of the operation of said motor vehicle in or upon the
public highways of the State." Public Acts of Connecticut, 1909, Chap. 211,
Sec. 16.
The rule contra to the principal case is upheld in Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v. Weir, 58 So. Rep. 641 (Fla. 1912) ; and the basis of the Massachusetts
doctrine is discussed in 61 U. oF P. L R. 34, and 62 U. oF P. L R. 216.
NEGLIGE CE-VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE LiMrinNG SPED--The breach of a
municipal ordinance regulating the speed of vehicles, where such breach is
the proximate cause of injury to a person, is negligence per se. O'Connor
v. United Railroads, 14T Pac. 89 (Cal. 1914); Anderson v. Kinnear, 141 Pac.
1151 (Wash. 1914).
The weight, as evidence, to be attached to the fact of violation of a
speed-regulating ordinance, in cases where that violation hat led to the injury
of an individual complainant, is a subject of great dispute. Kentucky does
not admit such ordinance into evidence at all, in determining the question of
negligence. Ford's Adm'r v. Paducah City Ry. Co., 124 Ky. 488 (1907).
Kentucky stands alone, however, in that respect. In every other State in
which the question has arisen, it has been held that the ordinance is admis-
sible in evidence, the weight to be given thereto varying in the different
States. Some courts merely say that the ordinance is competent evidence to
be submitted to the jury, as tending to show negligence. Lind v. Beck, 37 IlL
App. 43o (i8go); Wall v. Helena Street Ry. Co., t2 Mont. 44 (1892) ;Meek
v. Penn. Co., 38 Ohio St. 632 (1883); Bracken v. R. R., 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 22
(19o6); Southern Ry. Co. v. Stockdon, to6 Va. 693 (907). A few cases
declare that violation of speed-limiting ordinances is prima facie evidence
of negligence. Colorado Ry. Co. v. Robbins, 3o Colo. 449 (1902); Oates v.
Union Ry. Co., 27 R. 1. 499 (i9o6); Riley v. Transit Co., io Utah, 428
( 1894). Other courts, however, in accord with the principal case, hold that
the breach of a speed-regulating ordinance, if such breach has contributed
proximately to the injury complained of, is negligence per se. Robinson v.
Simpson, 8 Houst. 398 (Del. 1889); Penna. Co. v. Horton, 132 Ind. x89
(1892); Kolb v. Transit Co., 1o Mo. App. 14,3 (1903); Moody v. Osgood,
6o Barb. 644 (N. Y. 1871); Memphis Street Ry. Co. v. Haynes, 112 Tenn.
712 (i9oq4); Foley v. Northrup, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 277 (i9o7).
RECENT CASES
For a full treatment of the subject, see the article of W. P. Malburn,
Esq., "The Violation of Laws Limiting Speed as Negligence," in 45 Am.
LAw REV. 214. See also the recent cases in 62 U. or P. L R. 311, 572.
NuIsANcE-HosPrTA--I.njuNcTroN-A hospital was located on the prop-
erty adjoining that of complainants. The moans, shrieks and groans of
persons receiving surgical aid in the rooms of the hospital facing com-
plainants' house were such as to render wretched the lives of complainants
and of friends visiting them, and were such as to affect their nerves ind
impair their health. Also the market value of complainants' house was
depreciated. Held: Where a hospital is conclusively shown to be a nuisance,
its status as a charitable institution is no defense to an action to enjoin its.
maintenance. Kestner v. Hospital, pi Ati. Rep. 659 (Pa. 1914).
In determining whether a certain use of property constitutes a nuisance
the principal question is whether, in view of the obligation of the owner to
others, the use of the premises in question is reasonable. Are the owners
duly observing the legal precept sic utere tuo ut alienum non.laedas? U. S.
v. Luce, 141 Fed. Rep. 385 (1905). Hospitals are not prima facie or per se
nuisances. City of Lorain v. Rolling, 24 Ohio C. C. 82 (1902); Manning v.
Bruce, 186 Mass. 282 (1904); State v. Inhab's of Trenton, 63 Atl. Rep. 897
(N. J. i9o6). But they may be so located and conducted as to be nuisances
to people living close to them. Met. Asylum Dist. v. Hill, 6 App. Cas 193
(Eng. 1881); Gilford v. Babies' Hospital, I N. Y. Supp. 448 (888); Dea-
coness Home, etc., v. Bontjes, 2o7 Ill. 553 (1904).
PLEADINc--AMENDMzxT-DIsc1EmoON-The plaintiff, in a cause remanded
for a new trial, sought upon three separate occasions to amend his complaint
so as to change his cause of action. Two of the three applications to amend
were made after the statute of limitations had run. Held: The refusal of
the court to allow such amendments was not an abuse of the discretion of
the court. Elder v. Idaho-Washington Northern R. R., 141 Pac. Rep. 982
(Idaho, 1914).
After a new trial has been granted, the power of amendment is the same
as it was before the first trial, and it is in the discretion of the court to allow
or refuse all proposed amendments; Vawter v. Brown, 2o Ind. 277 (1863);
Central Savings Bank v. O'Connor, x39 Mich. 82 (i9os); and the result
in either case is not assignable for error, unless there has been an abuse
of discretion. Forrestell v. Wood, 23 At. Rep. 133 (Md. i89i). The general
rule is that amendments which propose a change in the original cause of
action will not be allowed either before the statute of limitations has run;
Pitkins v. N. Y., etc., R. R., 64 Conn. 482 (1894); Silver v. Jordan, 139 Mass.
28o (1885) ; but see contra, Cahn v. Tootle, 58 Kans. 26o i897); Thileman v.
New York, 71 App. Div. 595 (N. Y. 1902); or after the statute has run:
Union Pacific R. R. v. WVyler, 158 U. S. 285 (I84); Lane v. Water Co., =2o
Pa. 599 (i9o8); but see contra, Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Galta, 85 At.
Rep. 721 (Del. 1913). Amendments which introduce a new cause of action
will be allowed before the statute has run; Oliver v. Raymond, io8 Fed. Rep.
927 (igox) ; but not after the statute has run. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Scan-
lan, 17o Ill. io6 (1897).
Amendments which propose to change the original form of action will
be allowed in most States, provided the action is not changed from one ex
contractu to one ex delicto and vice versa. Gates v. Paul, 117 Wis. 170
(x9o3); Doyle v. Pelton, x34 Mich. p98 (903) ; Slater v. Fehlberg, 24 R. I.
574 (x9o3), contra. A few jurisdictions, however, allow the form of action
to be changed from tort to contract and vice versa. Smith v. Bellows, 7 Pa.
441 (1875). Amendments which do not change the cause or form of the
action are allowed, regardless of the running of the statute. Hertel v. Bois-
menue, 82 N. E. Rep. 298 (Ill. 1907); Schmelzer v. Chester Traction Co.,
28 Pa. 29 (i907). The tendency seems to be to allow all amendments which
will not prejudice the interests of the other party.
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PRo1'MTY-MINF OI-PERSOVALTY oR REALTY-The owner of a copper
mine placed on a dump nearby some two thousand tons of ore which were
of such quality that his methods of reductions did not render them profitable
to work. When the mine latter passed out of his possession, he sought to
recover damages for the conversion of the ore, claiming that it was person-
alty and still belonged to him. Held: The intention with which the ore was
extracted and placed on the dump controls in determining its situx. Stein-
feld v. Copper Company, T41 Pac. Rep. 847 (Ariz. 914).
The general rule is that minerals lying beneath the surface or on the
surface unworked are realty. Stoughtons Appeal, 88 Pa. i98 (1878);
Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425 (t896); Wilson v. Hughes, 43 W. Va. 826
(187); Oil Company v. Colquitt, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 29 (1902). But when
severed from the soil they become personal property. Hail v. Reed, I5 B.
Mon. 479 (Ky. 1854); Lykens Valley Coal Co. v. Dock, 62 Pa. 232 (1869).
As illustrated by the principal case, the kind of substance which will pass
under a lease will depend on the intent of the parties as evidenced by the
provisions and stipulations of the lease or conveyance. Doster v. Zinc Co.,
14o Pa. 147 (i8gi); Lance v. Coal Co., 163 Pa. 84 (1894).
ToiTs-ImPum"a NrcUGENcE-WVhile the plaintiff was riding in an auto-
mobile at the invitation of the owner, the machine was struck by one of
dctendant's cars negligently operated and he was injured. The defendant
claimed that the contributory negligence of the driver of the automobile
could be imputed to the plaintiff. Held: As the plaintiff was in the car as
an invitee, the driver was in no manner his servant, and the negligence of
the latter could not be imputed to him. Tonseth v. Portland Ry., 141 Pacif.
Rep. 868 (Ore. 1914).
The doctrine of imputed negligence had its rise in Thorogood v. Bryan,
8 C. B. u5 (1849). This case has been overruled in England, The Bernma,
12 P. D. 58 (1887) ; Mills v. Armstrong, 13 App. Cas. t (i888), but has been
followed in Wisconsin, Lightfoot v. Winnebago, 123 Wis. 479 (i9o5), and in
Michigan, though there it does not apply to adults. Hampel v. Detroit Ri. P.,
138 Mich. i (19o4), nor to a passenger of one common carrier injured by
the concurring negligence of it and another carrier. Cuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich.
s96, 6o2 (88i). The rule has been adopted without limitation in Vermont.
Carlisle v. Sheldon, 38 Vt. 44o (866), and in Montana, Whittaker v. Helena,
14 Mont. I2 (1894).
The unbroken line of authority in all other States is opposed to this
doctrine of Imputed Negligence. With some modifications in its application
to particular cases, the general rule is that where the injured person and
the driver do not occupy the position of master and servant, parent and
child, principal and agent, and where the plaintiff is himself in the exercise
of due care, having no reason to suspect carelessness or incompetency on
the part of the driver and is injured by the concurring negligence of the
driver of the vehicle and some third person, the guest is not precluded from
recovery against the third person by reason of the negligence of the driver.
Shultz v. Old Colony St. Ry., 193 Mass. 309, 315 (io7). To the same effect
are the following: Elyton Land Co. v. Mingea, 89 Ala. 521 (t889); Colorado
v. Southern Ry. v. Thomas, 33 Col. 517 (19O4); Hot Springs St. R. R. v.
Hildreth, 72 Ark. 572 (1904); Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31 (195o); West
Chicago St. R. R. v. Dougherty, 2o9 Ill. 241 (xgO4); Nesbit v. Garner, 75
Iowa, 314 (1888); Leavenworth v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 57 (i896); Cahill v. Cin-
cinnati Ry., 92 Ky. 345 (t89i); Neal v. Rendall, 98 Me. 69 (1903); Cunning-
ham v. Thief River Falls, 84 Minn. 21 (igoi); Holden v. Missouri R. R.,
177 Mo. 4S6 09o3) ; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. State, 79 Md. 335 (1894);
Noyes v. Boscawen, 64 N. H. 361 (1887); Bresee v. Los Angeles Traction
Co., 85 Pacif. 152 (Cal. 19o6); Mack v. Shawangunk, 9o N. Y. Supp. -6o
(1902); Ala. & Vicksburg Ry., 69 Miss. 444 (1876); Noonan v. Consolidated
Traction Co., 35 Vroom, 579 (N. J. 189); Duval v. Atlantic Coast Line, 134
N. Ca. 331 (19o4); Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 36 Ohio St. 86 (1887); Metro-
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politan Ry. v. Powell, 89 Ga. 6or (1892); Overson v. Grafton, 5 N. Dak. 2 8
(1895); Hydes Ferry Co. v. Yates, 67 S. W. 69 (Tenn. z92); Farle v.
Wilmington Ry., 52 Atd. 543 (Del. 1902) ; M. K. & T. Ky. v. Rogers, 9i Tex.
52 (z897); Atlantic & Danville R. R. v. Ironmonger, 95 Va. 625 (1898);
Shearer v. Buckley, 31 Wash. 370 (i9o3); Hajsek v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R. R., 68 Neb. 539 (igo3) ; Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366 (1885).
TRUSTS-PRECATORY WORnS-ASOLUTE GirF-A testator gave the residue
of his estate "to my wife for and during her natural life, with full power to
sell or dispose of my real estate, securities of any and all kinds, in such a
manner as she may desire, with the request, however, that care be taken in
investing any money that is not required for living expenses, with the wishthat she may not feel it is necessary to be unduly economical" and made no
gift over of the estate. Hd The request was merely precatory; the pro-vision giving the wife power of disposal of the estate disclosed testator's
intention to vest in the wife an absolute estate and not merely a life estate.Rogers Estate, z45 Pa. 206 ('9g4).
At the common law, in cases where trusts were sought to be created
under precatory words, if the subject (property) 
and the object (beneficiary)
were ce tain it was prima fade evidence that a power in trust was creates,
and the burden lay on the one claiming otherwise. Harland v..Trigg,
Brown Ch. Cases, J42aI (Eng. 1782); Malim v. Keighly.2 Vesey Jr. (Eng.
1794) ; IVynne v. Hawkins, x Brown's Ch. Cases, 179 (Eng. 1782).Today this is not the test, for, though uncertainty of object or subject is
evidence that nothing binding was intended, yet if they are certain it is notevidence that i ntended to be binding, and the test is, that the words
be given their ordinary meaning in conjunction with the intent expressed
by the whole will. Thi s applies, of course, only to precatory words, for nomatter how uncertain-the-object is when mandatory words are used, it will
bere heatoe a power in trust, even though it be so uncertain as to result
in favor of the heirs of the testator. In re Diggles, 39 CHl. Div. 253 (Eng.
r888); Lambe v. Eames, 6 Ch. Ap. 7 (87): Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass.
217 (iS8); Schmucker v. Reel, 6 o. 592 (89s); In Re Ingersoll, 3 N.
E. Rep. 47 (N. Y. 892). For other cases see Ames' Cases on Trusts, notes
pp. 87-9 . Under these tests clearly there was no trust established in the
princtpal case.
In addition there is the general rule that a gift for life without a gift
over passes the whole estate; this is not a rule of law, but one of con-
struction in aid of discovery of the testator's intention. Tyson's Estate, 9
Pa. 2;8 (8e); Brownfeld's Estate, 8 Watts, 465 (Pa. 1839); Diehl's
Ap peal. 36 Pa. lao (iSo); Shower's Estate, 21 Pa. 1 95 (905). Thus in
-erkel.s Appeal, to9 Pa. 235 (i885), where a testator gave to his wife "my
remaining personal property to her full ownership as long as .she doth live,
recommending that my executor shall see after that her money does notbecome lost," the court decided that the will vested the estate absolutely in
the widow as the recommendation was merely precatory and not sufficient
to convert the bequest into a trust. The decision arrived at in the principal
case seems therefore correct.
re ATins-SonFAC Aer-A railroad company built a culvert beneath its
tracks to carr surface water through to the plaintiff's land on the lower side.
Held: An injunction will not be granted unless injury will result to the
plaintiffs. Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Richardson, x4x Pac. Rep. 11o7 (Okla. 1914).The cases are in conflict as to the right to divert surface water accord-
ingly as they follow the rules of the common or of the civil law. The
former regarded surface water as a "common enemy," and every proprietor
was allowed to get rid of it as best he could, either by sending it back or by
passing it an to the lower proprietor, Reeves on Real Property, Vol i, P.
eod; Broadbent v. Ramsbotham. b Ex. 6ou (Eng. i86) ; Thoele v. Marvin
Mill Co. 148 S. n. Rep. 413 (Mo. i10)7; Healy v. Everett Traction Co., 139
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Pac. Rep. 6og (Wash. 194). This was early qualified by the requirement
that one proprietor could not protect himself in such a way, as to cause
harm to his neighbor, as by collecting the water and pouring it down in a
flood. This is the rule in England and in the majority of American jurisdic-
tions and is the one followed in the principal case. Broadbent v. Rams-
botham, supro; Louisville and N. Ry. v. Wilson, 14 Ky. L 719 (1893);
Bunderson v. Burlington and M. Ry. Co., 61 N. W. Rep. 721, 43 Neb. 545
(1895); New York, P. and N. Ry. v. Jones, 5o At. Rep. 423, 94 Md. 24
(igoi); Frisbie v. Cowen, 18 App. D. C. 381 (i9go); Ladd v. Redle, 75 Pac.
Rep. 691 (Wy. 19o4); Dorr v. Simmerson, 103 N. W. Rep. 8o6 (Iowa, 1905);
Pitts., Chicago, Cinn. and St. Louis Ry. v. Atkinson, 97 N. E. Rep. 353 (Ind.
1912) ; Lyons v. Fairmont Real Estate Co., 77 S. E. Rep. sos (W. Va. 1913);
Slater v. Price, 8o S. E. 372 (S. C. 1914) ; Grimes v. St. Lbuis Ry., i68 S.W.
Rep. 317 (Mo. 1914).
The civil law compelled the lower of two adjacent estates to receive
the drainage according to the natural contour of the land. Under this view
the upper proprietor must let the water pass off naturally and a fortiori has
no right to converge it into a stream to the detriment of his neighbor. A
few . American jurisdictions have adopted this doctrine. Livingston v.
McDonald, 21 Iowa, x6o (1866); La. Code. Art. 656; Foley v. Gadchaux, 48
La. Ann. 466 (x896); Ill. Cent. Ry. v. Miller, 68 Miss. 760 ('891); Wood
v. Moulton, 146 Cal. 317 (i9o5); Town of Bois D'Arc v. Convery, 99 N. -.
Rep. 666 (Ill. 1912); Louisville and N. Ry. v, Maxwell, 148 S. W. Rep. 692
(Tenn. 1912). Pennsylvania and Alabama have adopted a "reasonable com-
promise" and follow the common law rule in the municipalities and the
civil law rule in rural estates. This is based on economic principles. White
v. Phila. and Reading Ry., 46 Pa. Sup. Ct. 372 (911); Wilson v. McCluskey,
46 Pa. Sup. Ct. 594 (1x11); Miller v. Laubach, 47 Pa. 154 (1864); Rhoads
v. Davidheiser. 133 Pa. 226 (i8go) ; Hall v. Rising, 37 So.Rep. 56, 141 Ala.
431 (19o4); Shahan v. Brown, 6o So. Rep. 891, 43 L. R. T. (N. S.) 792
(Ala. 1913). Minnesota and Wisconsin put the entire question upon a "rea-
sonable basis." Howard v. Ill. Cent. Ry.. t33 N. W. Rep. 557 (Minn. 1911);
Rieck v. Schamanski. 134 N. W. Rep. 228 (Minn. 1912); Adlington v. City
of Viroqua, 144 N. W. Rep. 113o (Wis. 1914). Arkansas and South Carolina
follow neither doctrine, but look to the "circumstances of each case." Little
Rock Ry. v. Chapman, 39 Ark. 463 (1882); Waldrop v. Greenwood Ry., 28
S. C. 157, 23 Am. L R. 387 (1887).
For an excellent summary of the law on this subject, see opinion of
Cooper, J, in Ill. Cent. Ry. v. Miller, supra, and Gould on Waters, §§26, 266.
WILLs-RULE oN SHEuzvYs CAsE-A testator devised his house to "my
daughter for life, and upon her death to the children of my said daughter
share and share alike, etc." Held: The rule in Shelley's Case did not apply
and that the daughter only took a life estate. Stout v. Good, 245 Pa. 383
A1Ttestator devised realty to "my son for life, and upon his decease to
his descendants who shall then be living, etc." Held: The rule did not apply
and the son obtained only a life estate. Lee v. Sanson, 245 Pa. 392 (1914).
A testator's will read, "After the death of my wife, I devise to A and B
the use and income of all my estate, share and share alike, for their lives.
In case of the decease of one, the other shall have a life interest in one-
half of my estate and the remainder shall be appropriated as hereinafter
provided. After the death of A and B, I devise the undivided one-half part
of all my estate to the heirs of A and the other one-half part to the heirs
of B, to have and to hold forever." Held: Under the rule in Shelley's Case,
B took a fee simple title in the undivided one-half interest in the real estate.
Harrison v. Harris, 245 Pa. 397 (1914).
The Pennsylvania attitude is that the rule in Shelley's Case is not a
rule of construction but of law and is never applied until the meaning of
the testator is first ascertained. If the words show that the testator intended
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the remaindernan to take directly from him and not b- inheritance from the
devisee of the life estate, then the rule has no application. On the other
hand, if they show a contrary intention, the rule applies. Kemp v. Rein-
hard, 228 Pa. 143 (i9io); Lauer v. Hoffman, 24i Pa. 315 (1913) ; Guthries'
Appeal, 37 Pa. 9 (i86i). In accord with the first case, the authorities agree
that "children" is Prina facie a word of purchase, and that it cannot be con-
strued otherwise unless the context plainly shows that the testator did not
employ the word in its ordinary sense. Affolter v. May, 15 Pa. 54 (1887);
Halderman v. Halderman, 40 Pa. 29 (186); Pifer v. Locke, 2o5 Pa. 616
(z9o3), and therefore the rule should not apply. It requires the same degree
of conclusive evidence to enlarge "children" to a word of limitation as it
does to restrict "heirs" or "heirs of the body" to words of purchase. Gut&'s
Appeal, espra.
"Issue' is prima facie a word of limitation, but it readily yields to a
context that indicates its use as a word of purchase. Beckly v. Reigert, 212
Pa. 9g (x9o5); Parkhurst v. Hanower, 142 Pa. 432 (189); Robins v. Quinz
livien, - Pa. 333 (x875). The word "descendants" is at most only the equiva-
lent of "issue.", Waln's Estate, 189 Pa. 631, 632-3 (&80), but when qualified
by the phrase "may be then living" it is clearly a word of purchase. Taylor
v. Taylor, 63 Pa. 481 (x869); Jones" v. Jones, 2o Pa. 548 (9oI); though
such a phrase is not sufficient to reduce such technical terms as eirse or
"heirs of the body" to words of purchase. Cresswel's Appeal, 14 Pa. 288
('86i) ; Cockins' Appeal, iii Pa. 26 (1885); Heister v. Yerger, x66 Pa. 445
( 895), unless such is clear by other parts of the will. McCann v. McCann,
197 Pa. 452 (ixoo) ; Hill v. Giles, 2o Pa. 21S (1901).
When "heirs" is employed in connection with remaindermen the rule
in Shelley's Case applies, unless other language in the will clearly demon-
strates that the word was not intended in its technical sense, as a term of
limitation, so clear as to leave no reasonable doubt. Little's Appeal, 117 Pa.
14 (1887); Grimes v. Shirk, 169 Pa. 74 (1895); Kemp v. Rheinhard, 228 Pa.
143 (19n); Shapley v. Diehl, 203 Pa. 566 (1902); O'Rourke v. Sherwin,
z56 Pa. 285 (1893), and the round about way which the testator takes to say
"heirs" in the third principle case does not affect the substance. McKee v.
McKinley, 33 Pa. 92 (1859). It seems, therefore, that the decisions in the
principal cases are correct.
